Location

Berlin, Germany

Nationality

Colombian

Phone

+49 30 25491 443

Research

published and unpublished papers

Job Market Paper

Abstract

When individuals decide whether or not to lie, they compare their extrinsic benefits with the psychological cost of violating their norms. This paper analyzes the impact of lying aversion and prosociality on cheating. I first present a model that incorporates heterogeneous lying costs and prosociality as a part of the individual's preferences. I show that individuals are mostly honest when some else has lied on their behalf. At the same time, if lying generates a positive externality, individuals lie more due to prosociality motives. I test these predictions in two online experiments. I show that participants are more dishonest when their lies benefit others. More importantly, I present evidence that, on average, the prosocial motive is stronger than the lying aversion motive. Further results show that individuals care about the influence they have on others' outcomes rather than taking actions that signal a prosocial intention, but do not impact others' outcomes.

Publications

Published Paper
Abstract

Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports.

Working Paper Published Paper Short Summary
Abstract

We study the effect of entitlement on the willingness to lie. We set up a model of lying where individuals feel more or less entitled to their endowment depending on how they earned it. When given the opportunity to lie to keep their endowment, individuals who feel more entitled are encouraged to lie while others are discouraged. To test the model predictions we use a laboratory experiment where we compare the lying behavior of participants endowed with a high endowment and participants endowed with a low endowment. In one treatment, the allocation of the endowment is decided by participants’ performance, and in the other, it is determined by a random draw. Our study shows that deservingness influences lying in an intuitive direction: when participants performance determines income, those who earn less money lie less than those who earn more. We do not find differences in lying when participants perform the same task but lie to keep windfall endowments.

Working Paper Published Paper
Abstract

Does transparency, understood as information precision on budget size, deter embezzlement and bribery when they co-occur? We use a laboratory experiment to study the impact of transparency on reducing corruption in these contexts. Our results show that transparency decreases embezzlement while it has no significant effect on bribery. One potential explanation of the observed differential impact of transparency is that resource managers are strategically using the uncertainty on the available budget in their favor. In the experiment, participants in the resource manager role act as if low public investment rates were a consequence of bad luck (low budget) instead of misappropriation. Specifically, embezzlement decreases with high transparency, while bribes remain unaffected. This result suggests that the impact of transparency is not similar on all types of corruption when different types co-occur.

Published Paper
Abstract

I analyze the impact of suggestive advice messages and tipping on a third party’s judgment. The experimental design is based on a model with three players, wherein two players create, by an investment of resources and effort, a joint pie, and the third player must decide how much of the pie to allocate to each of the first two players. To assess the impact of suggestive messages and tips, I use a baseline treatment in which there is no way of influencing the decision-maker. Thus, if the treatments’ manipulations are unable to bias decision-makers, their decisions should be the same as those made under the baseline conditions. The main finding is that the possibility of an ex-post monetary gift (tip) increases the value allocated to a player who may tip the decision-maker in comparison with a context-free of influence. Conversely, suggestive messages do not have this effect, and can even reduce the value allocated to the sender.

Work in progress

The effect of corruption on tax evasion
with Yuliet Verbel. Design phase.

Curriculum Vitae

More information about me.

Education

Berlin School of Economics.
Forth year PhD student. 2017-Current

Humboldt-University, the Free University, the Technical University, WZB, ESMT, Hertie School, and University of Postdam. Berlin, Germany.

M.A. game theory, experimental economics and applied econometrics.
2013 – 2014

GATE-LSE - Université Lumière Lyon 2. Lyon, France.

B.A. Economics
2007 – 2011

Industrial University of Santander, Bucaramanga, Colombia

Experience

Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) - Berlin
2017 - Current

Research Fellow

Catholic University of Colombia - Colombia
2015 – 2017

Researcher and Lecturer

University of Bogota Jorge Tadeo Lozano - Colombia
2015 – 2016

Adjunct lecturer.

Research group EMAR - Industrial University of Santander - Colombia
2011 – 2014

Researcher

Industrial University of Santander - Colombia
2010 – 2011

Research assistant

Languages

colombia

Spanish (Native)

English

English, Fluent

French

French, Advanced (B2)

German

German, Beginner (A2)

Computer Skills

Pyhton

Pyhton

Z-tree

Z-tree

Otree

Otree

R

R

LATEX

LaTeX

Stata

Stata

html5

html5

css

css

bootstrap

Bootstrap